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Brian Derrah* Canada and the Challenge of
Foreign Investment: The First
Decade of Foreign
Investment Review
I. Background and Design
The enactment of the Foreign Investment Review Act did not halt
the evolution of foreign investment policy, nor did the creation of
the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) end the foreign
investment problem. For many, the agency became part of the
problem. Now, a decade since its inception, FIRA operates in one
of the few areas of government endeavour that has no statutorily
developed foreign investment policy. The effectiveness of the
agency as an articulator and implementor of foreign investment
policy requires evaluation. This paper will review the Canadian
government's response to the foreign investment challenge - the
development of legislation for the regulation and control of foreign
investment. It will explore how the structure of the agency, which
puts the task of decision-making in the hands of the political
executive, and its failure to develop and publish policy guidelines
provide an irritant to relations both between Canada and the United
States and between government and business.' The period of
divergent radicalism following the Canadian and American
elections of 1980 set the stage for the reforms now underway at the
agency.
(a) Setting the Stage
The opening years of this decade saw Canada and its dominant
*Of the Public Utilities Board, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
1. The Hon. Mark MacGuigan, speaking to the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council in Los Angeles on January 29, 1982, as Canada's External Affairs
Minister, described the importance of the partnership as follows: "'Canada is one of
the world's greatest trading nations. We export over a quarter of our GNP,
compared to the United States which exports about 8 percent. Canada and the
United States have the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. Your trade
with us is almost as large as your trade with the entire European Community,
almost twice your trade with Japan... You have approximately $70 billion invested
in Canada and we have about $13 billion invested in your country. I recite all this
arithmetic simply to underline the importance of Canada-U.S. relations. Clearly we
have a great deal at stake."
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partner in trade and investment, the United States, moving on a
collision course. A newly elected Trudeau government, committed
to a more aggressive Canadian ownership stance with a
strengthened Foreign Investment Review Agency and a generally
greater involvement in the economy, came to power in 1980. In the
United States, the Reagan administration, which came to power in
1981, was committed to reducing government involvement in the
economy, eliminating impediments to the free flow of goods and
investment, and, in general, the defence of the United States's
economic interests. The institutional dynamics of each nation
responded to their different priorities. The energy crisis of the late
seventies produced windfall revenues for the producing provinces
and for the largely American-owned oil and gas industry.
Responding to its own revenue needs, the Canadian federal
government saw the oil and gas industry as a major new source of
revenue with which it could control its growing deficit. The
merchandise trade balance between the two nations moved from a
surplus in 1975, which favoured the United States, to a major deficit
in 1982, amounting to over $9 billion (U.S.). 2 In the United States,
the U.S. Trade Agreements Act, implementing the Tokoyo Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) tariff
reductions, had prepared the new administration to react with a
greater capacity. The Office of U.S. Trade Representative had been
created to coordinate trade policy, a Cabinet-level Trade Policy
Committee had been expanded to mirror the responsibilities of the
Trade Representative, and, in addition, the Trade Representative
was given a special mandate to study moves to liberalize trade with
the rest of North America. The United States had thus acquired the
legal capacity, the institutional framework, and the political will
with which to respond quickly and decisively to perceived threats to
American interests. The new decade also saw a number of highly
visible Canadian take-over bids against such major firms in the
United States as St. Joe Minerals, Conoco, City Service, and
Hudson Bay Oil and Gas. Such corporate initiatives were suspect in
that the Canadian firms were viewed as operating from a base that
was safe from take-overs.
In contrast to the early 1970s, the 1980s began as a period of net
outflows from Canada of foreign direct investment, amounting to
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business (March, 1983) at
52, Table 3 - U.S. Merchandise Trade, lines 9, 26.
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some $4.6 billion in 1981, of which $3.6 billion went to the United
States. 3 At a time of growing Canadian corporate investment and
export- penetration, American firms faced open hostility from the
new Canadian government. In April 1980, the Canadian govern-
ment announced amendments to the Foreign Investment Review Act
which were to take the form of performance reviews of
foreign-owned corporations currently operating in Canada, publica-
tion of significant take-over proposals in order to allow Canadian
investors a chance to bid, and assistance to Canadian companies
bidding against proposed take-overs. Later that year, Canada
unveiled its National Energy Program (NEP), which was aimed at
reducing the role of foreign-owned corporations in the oil and gas
industry, most of which were U.S.-based. 4 The FIRA set the
allowable rate for foreign investment in the oil and gas industry, for
the year ending 31 March 1981, at 53 percent for new business
applications and 39 percent for take-over applications, down nearly
one half from 93 and 73 percent, respectively, in 1978. The rate of
take-overs allowable under FIRA fell to 18 percent in the following
year. 5 Not surprisingly, Canadian foreign investment policy became
a flash point for Canada-United States relations, both bilaterally and
multilaterally.
If 1980 and 1981 set the stage for a major reconsideration of the
role of FIRA as the primary vehicle for foreign investment policy,
1982 marked a climax in such discussions. On 5 January 1982, the
United States initiated an action under the GATT, alleging that
3. Statistics Canada, Quarterly Estimates of the Canadian Balance of Interna-
tional Payments (fourth quarter, 1982) 67-001 at 72-73, Table 16 - Canadian
Balance of International Payments, line 2 1.
4. Grey, in Trade Policy in the 1980's: An Agenda for Action (Montreal: C. D.
Howe Institute, 1981) at 71, stated that "the N.E.P. tends to merge with U.S.
concern about the FIRA program... It is likely the United States will be
increasingly vigilant about the determination of 'significant benefit to Canada'. It
will . . .be concerned that FIRA may negotiate undertakings requiring minimum
levels of exports and thus improve export performance or may insist on the
application of domestic content preferences in company purchasing policies."
5. Such an approval rate, expressed as a percentage of "resolved" cases, can be
criticized as overstating the actual survival rate, since it fails to consider the firms
who withdraw from the review process prior to "certification as reviewable". The
review agency considers a case "resolved" when the application is completed. In
the course of FIRA requests for information to clarify investment intentions, the
firm may gain an appreciation of its likelihood of success and withdraw from the
review process.
It is probable that the 18-percent approval rate for the oil and gas industry might
decline to near zero if two other factors were considered. First, the 18 percent
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FIRA obliged nonresident investors to undertake certain trade
commitments, the effect of which was to distort the flow of
international trade. Such undertakings, it was alleged, were in
conflict with Canadian obligations under the GATT. By mid-year,
Canadian business leaders had become aware both that the recession
was approaching the levels of the 1930s and that FIRA's new,
tougher approach may have contributed to the economic downturn.
The respected Burns Fry "Economic Commentary" for 6 August
1982 alleged that "Canada's experiment with economic nationalism
[was] now costing us about $38 billion of lost output a year along
with the lost jobs and lost profits." On 22 October, Burns Fry again
attacked FIRA, saying: "The repeal of the Foreign Investment
Review Act" was "desirable not only to stop discouraging the
foreign investment that will create jobs . . . but to stop the
substantial drain of income .. .The negative impact appears to us
to be both sizeable and clear." In August of 1982, the provincial
first ministers called for the abolition of FIRA as part of their
Economic Recovery proposal. By the fall of 1982, FIRA was to
have both a new minister and a new commissioner.
(b) Policy Development
Since the 1960s, Canadian legislative schemes and policy regarding
the regulation and control of foreign investment have gone through
at least five successive stages.6 The first stage was characterized by
a series of amendments, designed to generate a greater degree of
Canadian ownership, particularly of voting shares. Many of the
amendments were made to enactments regulating so-called key
actually represents the broader FIRA category of mines, mineral fuels, and
incidental services. During this period, the oil and gas industry was undoubtedly
the most active segment of this category and the one facing the most rigorous FIRA
test. Thus, the 18-percent approval rate may, in fact, merely represent successful
non-oil and gas applicants in that category. Second, the oil and gas approval rate of
18 percent would be further reduced if the withdrawals referred to above were
included in the base calculation. (Note that whenever statistics are used for a
specific year, they are based on the data released by the agency through its annual
reports. All such data is compiled on a government fiscal-year basis.)
6. Donaldson and Jackson, The Foreign Investment Review Act: An Analysis of the
Legislation (1975), Can. Bar Rev. 175, and Donaldson, Foreign Investment
Review and Canadianization [1982] Special Lectures LSUC 462. Others would
begin such a study of "dirigiste" policies in response to American investment with
the building of the C.P.R. and what Aitken has viewed as the defensive nature of
government intervention in Canada: "It has been part of a general strategy of
continuing the expansionism of the stronger and more aggressive economy of the
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sectors of the Canadian economy, for example, the Bank Act, 7 the
Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, 8 the Loans
Companies Act, 9 the Trust Companies Act,' 0 and the Investment
Companies Act." Regulations restricting mining' 2 and oil and gas
leases' 3 on crown lands and mineral exploration assistance grants
were also amended.' 4 These amendments generally required a base
level of Canadian directors, coupled with Canadian ownership of
corporations in key-sector industries. ' 5 For example, the Broadcast-
ing Act' 6 identified communication and culture as a key-sector
industry. Pursuant to the act, the Governor-in-Council issued
directives to the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica-
tions Commission (CRTC) prohibiting the granting of broadcasting
licences to persons who were not Canadian citizens or "eligible
Canadian corporations". In addition, the withholding tax levied
through the Income Tax Act on payments made by Canadian
corporations to nonresidents was reduced where 25 percent of the
board of directors was Canadian and where 25 percent or more of
the voting shares was owned by resident Canadians.' 7 For
"Canadian controlled private corporations", the act was amended
to provide for a tax rate of about one half the normal rate.'
8
United States and preserving a distinct political sovereignty ...each phase of
expansion in Canada has been a tactical move designed to forestall, counteract, or
restrain the northward extension of American economic and political influence.
Primary responsibility for maintaining and strengthening this policy of defensive
expansionism has fallen on the state." H.G.J. Aitken, "Defensive Expansion: The
State and Economic Growth in Canada", in W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins,
eds., Approaches to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1961) at 221.
7. S.C. 1966-67, c. 87, subsecs. 10(4), 18(3), 20(2) and ss. 52-56.
8. S.C. 1957-58, c. 11, s. 3 and S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 3.
9. S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 38.
10. S.C. 1964-65, c. 40, s. 30.
11. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 33, ss. 10-15.
12. Canada Mining Regulations, SOR/61-86, as am. by SOR/62-249 and by
SOR/66-80.
13. Canada Oil and Gas Regulations, SOR/60-182.
14. Northern Mineral Exploration Assistance Regulations, SOR/66-404, as am. by
SOR/67-584.
15. These base levels normally required 75 percent of the directors to be resident
Canadian citizens and individual nonresident shareholders to hold no more than 10
percent of the outstanding voting shares.
16. R.S.C. 1970, c. B-Il. Direction to the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, S.O.R./69-590, as am. by S.O.R./71-33.
17. S.C. 1964-65, c. 13.
18. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 125.
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Throughout this period of amendments to key sector regulatory
legislation and to certain legislation of a general application,
legislators and policy-makers often suffered from a lack of
information. In view of this problem, the Corporations and Labour
Unions Returns Act was enacted in 1962 to aid in the determination
of the extent and nature of foreign ownership in Canada. ' 9
The second stage of policy development was characterized by ad
hoc executive-level intervention to stop proposed transactions. 20 In
197 1, the government intervened to prevent the sale of control of
Denison Mines Limited to foreign interests and, in 1972, to prevent
the proposed acquisition of the Home Oil Company Limited. 2' Such
intervention made obvious the need for legislation of general
application, as it was felt that such "ad hoc intervention had a
detrimental effect on investment certainty and predictability", for
workable guidelines were needed to provide "an environment of
certainty and continuity in which commercial transactions could
flourish. ''22
The third stage of development was characterized by searches for
an appropriate instrument to respond to the effect of foreign
investment and ownership on Canadian industry, namely, the
attendant truncation and lack of technological innovation. 23 The
19. S.C. 1962, c. 26. This enactment of the Diefenbaker government was. in large
pan. the result of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (the
"Gordon Commission") and what was seen as the Kennedy administration's
intervention into Canadian affairs through American-based corporations and unions
operating in Canada. Until 1979. the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce,
the FIRA minister, was responsible for the act. The Corporations and Labour
Unions Returns Act Annual Report for 1979 (Statistics Canada, 71-202) indicates
that "the purpose of the Act is to collect financial and other information on the
affairs of certain corporations and labour unions carrying on activities in Canada.
Such information was considered necessary to evaluate the extent and effect of
non-resident ownership and control of corporations in Canada and the extent and
effect of the association of Canadians with international labour unions."
20. See Frank and Gudgeon, infra, note 93 at 96-97.
21. Smith, The Treasure Seekers: The Men Who Built Home Oil (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1978).
22. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 474, and Donaldson and Jackson, supra, note 6 at
176.
23. It is worthwhile to consider Britton and Gilmour, The Weakest Link: A
Technological Perspective on Canadian Industrial Underdevelopment (Back-
ground Study 43, Science Council of Canada, 1978) at 97-98, which states the
following:
In large part the symptoms of dependency . ..have been captured in the
concept of truncation, as developed by the Gray Report ...
A truncated firm is one which does not carry out all functions - from the
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Watkins Task Force Report on Foreign Ownership and the Structure
of Canadian Industry had recommended that an agency be
established to coordinate policies with respect to multinational
enterprises and to exercise surveillance over the operation of foreign
corporations in Canada. 24 The agency was to take over the
administration of the 1966 "Guiding Principles of Good Corporate
Behavior" (the "Winters Guidelines"). Watkins recommended that
the government explore the option of requiring foreign investors to
guarantee greater benefits to Canadian industry. The next relevant
report was that of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and
National Defence (the "Wahn Report"), which recommended that
a "Canadian Ownership Law" and a "Canadian Ownership and
Control Bureau" exist under the direction of a minister. As well as
performing the functions referred to in the Watkins Report, this
agency would cooperate with other government departments and
agencies to devise better methods for assuring that foreign
enterprises complied with the Winters Guidelines. The third major
report contributing to the development of foreign investment policy,
entitled Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, was the result of a
Cabinet-level working group headed by the Honourable Herb
Gray. 25 Known as the Gray Report, it was to provide the underlying
rationale and basic framework for the Foreign Investment Review
Act, introduced the year after the report was published. The report
recommended that new direct investment be subject to a screening
original research required through all the aspects of marketing - necessary for
developing, producing and marketing its goods. One or more of these functions
are carried out by the foreign parent . . . [T]runcation may mean less
production for the Canadian market, less opportunity for innovation and
entrepreneurship, fewer export sales, fewer supporting services, less training of
Canadian personnel in various skills . . . less spillover of economic activity and
so on.
These perceptive observations from the Gray Report are central to
understanding why Canadian secondary manufacturing is stunted and
underdeveloped. Many of those who shrugged off the report as another piece of
nationalistic rhetoric, and others who believe that foreign ownership is not a
problem to Canadian industry, have not stopped to consider, or have failed to
grasp, the essential structure of a truncated medium/high technology industry in
Canada.
24. Task Force Report on the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Privy
Council Office, 1968) at 369-70, 395-397, 403 (hereafter the "Watkins Report").
25. Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972)
(hereafter the -Gray Report").
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or review process having five central features: cost benefit analysis,
evaluation on a case-by-case basis, a bargaining or negotiating
process with foreign investors, a framework of policy guidance, and
selectivity and concentration on major transactions.
The Gray Report, like the Watkins Report, saw the proposed
foreign investment review process as seeking to "maximize the
benefits of foreign investment and its costs of bargaining on a
case-by-case basis with individual investors." The bargaining
process was to be subject to certain conditions, first through
articulated policy guidance and, second, through its application
only to economically significant transactions. The review process
would thus "be guided by criteria established by legislation" and
operated within the framework of the government's industrial
strategy. 26 It was held that "[r]eview should concentrate on the
relatively small proportion of foreign investments which were of
greatest concern to Canada at any point in time," 27 that is, on
"transactions of defined significance."
28
The Gray Report inaugurated the fourth stage of regulation and
control of foreign investment, which Donaldson termed "screening
and review legislation of a general nature and broad application."
29
On 4 May 1972, two days after the official release of the report, the
government introduced Bill C-201, the Foreign Take-Over Review
Act.3 0 This bill provided for a mandatory screening and review of
takeovers of Canadian business by nonresidents. However, the bill
died on the Order Paper with the election in the fall of 1972.31 In
January 1973, the new government introduced Bill C-132, the
Foreign Investment Review Act,3 2 which expanded the old bill
to include the review of new direct investment in Canada,
"crystallizing the government policy formed in the Gray
Report."
33
26. The Gray Report, supra, note 25 at 456, recommended that bargaining - not
operate on the basis of economically unsound incrementation but in accordance
with the government's industrial strategy.'
27. Ibid, at 453.
28. Ibid, at 491.
29. Donaldson, supra, note 6.
30. Fourth Session, 28th Parliament, 4 May 1972.
31. Bill C-201 had been both approved by the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs and considered by the Senate
Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.
32. First Session, 29th Parliament, 24 January 1973.
33. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 476.
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The Foreign Investment Review Act was not to represent the last
stage of foreign investment policy, however. Instead, the fifth, or
post-FIRA, stage was to be marked by "the Canadianization of
certain industry sectors and an enhancement of the economic and
social benefits for Canada in other sectors." 3 4 Later developments
reflect major policy initiatives taken outside of the Review Act,
35
such as the new Bank Act
36 and the National Energy Program.
3 7
The new Bank Act allows foreign banks, for the first time in
Canada, to operate through representative offices and
subsidiaries. 3 8 It prohibits the Minister of Finance from issuing
letters of patent incorporating a foreign bank subsidiary unless the
minister is satisfied that the subsidiary has the potential to make a
34. Ibid, at 464.
35. Bill C-104, infra, note 37, represents an exception. and not a substantive
amendment, to FIRA.
36. Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 40.
37. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, The National Energy Program:
Update 1982. At 19, the Update states that, since the beginning of the NEP, the
government has sponsored 14 new bills:
Bill Title
C-75 An Act respecting a home insulation program for certain provinces.
C-76 An Act respecting a home insulation program for certain Maritime
Provinces in Canada.
C-77 An Act respecting oil conservation and the substitution for oil of
other energy sources.
C-60 An Act to amend the NEB Act.
C-87 An Act to amend the NEB Act (No. 2).
C-48 An Act to regulate oil and gas interests in Canada Lands and to
amend the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act.
C- 101 An Act to amend the Petro-Canada Act,
C- 102 An Act to amend the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources
A ct.
C- 103 An Act to amend the Petroleum Administration Act and to enact
provisions related thereto.
C-104 An Act respecting petroleum incentives and Canadian ownership
and controls determination and to amend the Foreign Investment
Review Act.
C- 105 An Act to amend the Canadian Business Corporation Act.
C-106 An Act respecting energy monitoring and to amend the Energy
Supplies Emergency Act, 1979 and the Oil Substitution and
Conservation Act.
C- 107 An Act respecting motor vehicle fuel consumption standards.
C- 108 An Act to amend the National Energy Board Act (No. 3).
38. The new Bank Act requires at least 50 percent of the directors to be Canadian.
Assets must be maintained in Canada and the overall asset limit of all foreign banks
may not grow beyond 8 percent of the total assets of all Canadian banks. Since 30
July 198 1. nearly 60 foreign banks have been authorized to operate in Canada.
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contribution to competitive banking in Canada and that reciprocal
treatment for Canadian banks exists in the foreign bank's home
jurisdiction. None of the shares may be transferred without approval
of the minister. The jurisdiction of the Foreign Investment Review
Act in connection with new business or take-over activities of
foreign banks is excluded by subsection 307(1) of the new Bank
Act. Under subsection 307(2), the establishment by a foreign bank
of a representative office in Canada which has been registered with
the Inspector of Banks is deemed not to be the establishment of a
new business for the purpose of FIRA.
The National Energy Program, unveiled in the 1980 budget, has
Canadian ownership objectives that include not only Canadian
private ownership and control targets, but also a major government
acquisition program and strict requirements for the use of domestic
goods and services. The Canadianization objective of the energy
policy is to secure 50 percent Canadian ownership (government and
investor owned) by 1990. This emphasis "on gaining for Canadians
increased ownership and control over their own resources reflect[s]
a conviction that there are important economic benefits in
encouraging Canadians to own more of the oil and gas industry, and
to participate more actively in its management in the future." 3 9
(c) The Scope of the Foreign Investment Review Act
The Foreign Investment Review Act provided for the establishment
of the Foreign Investment Review Agency. That agency receives
applications and does preliminary processing, acting as a secretariat
for the statutory decision-makers, namely, the minister and the
Cabinet. The FIRA minister advises Cabinet on each application,
and Cabinet, in turn, allows or disallows each reviewable
investment application and decides on the basis of a "significant
benefit test", using the five criteria found in section 2(2). The
political executive is required to allow the investment if it concludes
that, having regard to the factors enumerated in subsection 2(2),
"the investment is or is likely to be of significant benefit to
Canada." The test is political and economic, not legal, and it is the
sole test of whether a reviewable investment should be allowed or
rejected. By law, it must be applied to every case - that is, to any
"acquisition of control" of a "Canadian business enterprise" by a
39. Update 1982, supra, note 37 at 45.
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"non-eligible person" of a "new business", or the expansion of an
existing business, controlled "in fact" by a "non-eligible person",
existing business, controlled "in fact" by a "non-eligible person"
into an "unrelated business." The threshhold test of the need for an
investment to be reviewed is whether or not the investor is a
noneligible person. Such an investor must establish, to the
satisfaction of Cabinet, that the proposed investment is likely to be
of significant benefit to Canada under the section 2(2) criteria. The
question as to the applicability of the act is essentially a legal one.
The review agency may accept commitments from the applicant
in regard to its findings of significant benefit:
"While . . . undertakings . . . are not mandatory, it is obvious
that [they] can often help the applicant to make his proposal
complete and precise, and thus allow the government to access with
greater certainty the effects of the investment. Undertakings
are . . . binding on the applicant if the investment is allowed, and
there are provisions in the Act whereby in case of non-compliance
the Minister may apply to the courts for remedial orders." 40 These
undertakings are an indication to the observer of the particular
industrial policy being pursued at that moment. Applicants often
undertake to spell out in a quantitative fashion their local sourcing
intentions and their plans to import components or to export and
market them internationally. For example, Bally Canada Inc.
announced on 3 July 1981 that the Swiss retailer and manufacturer
of shoes undertook to purchase 50 percent of its requirements from
Canadian manufacturers by 198541. And, on 21 September 1981,
Apple Computer announced that "to perform at least 80 percent of
all repairs and maintenance service for products . . . [in Canada] at
the end of the first year following allowance, Canadian value added,
calculated in accordance with the specified formula, will not be less
than 30 percent of the cost of the goods sold in Canada."
42
Every year, the Enforcement Division of the agency reviews
many of the outstanding undertakings in order to monitor
compliance. In 1982, the agency "monitored the implementation of
plans and undertakings provided by investors in 1,198 proposals
40. Dewhirst, "'The Foreign Investment Review Act", in Dhawan, Etemad, and
Wright, eds., International Business: A Canadian Perspective, (Toronto:
Addison-Wesley, 1981) 459; see also Beck, Law and Policy in the Operations of
Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency ( 1981). 45 Sask. L. Rev. 183.
41. FIRA News Release, F-166, July 3, 1981.
42. FIRA News Release, F- 180, September 21, 1981.
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that had been allowed...,,43 Where the agency finds that the
investor has been unable to comply with his undertaking, due to
economic conditions, undertakings may be renegotiated under what
has become known as the "frisbee provision". 44 This provision
states that: "In normal circumstances the inability to fulfil
undertakings will lead to discussions with the Minister and perhaps
to the negotiation of new undertakings .. .If . . . the failure to
comply with an undertaking is clearly the result of changed market
conditions - for example, the undertakings to export frisbees is
followed by the collapse of the frisbee market - the person would
not be held accountable."
In The Weakest Link: A Technological Perspective on Canadian
Industrial Underdevelopment, the Science Council of Canada
described FIRA "as a good instrument in search of the appropriate
policy." ' 45 The review agency, it said, was "put in place totally
lacking in the essential guidance which only a national industrial
development strategy could provide, at a time when Canada was
already a 'mature' industrial country, and when foreign interests
already totally dominated Canadian industry." In 1974, shortly
after the establishment of FIRA, Feltham and Ravenbush concluded
that its success "as a policy instrument in the context of the
Canadian economy as a whole" depended on "the development of
well-reasoned and well-articulated industry policies." 46 In words
that were to become prophetic, the Gray Report had recommended
that bargaining should "not operate on the basis of economically
unsound incrementalism but in accordance with the government's
industrial strategy." Otherwise the review process might concern
itself solely "with bargaining for more exports . ..procurements
and . ..research and development without regard to their impact
on efficient industrial development . . .To avoid such a costly
approach, the review agency should be directed to follow certain
43. FIRA Annual Report (FY 1982) at 5.
44. FIRA Minister Gillespie in Committee on 5 June 1973. The first public
reference to a "frisbee" was that of Marks & Spencer. The agency published the
new undertakings, even though the first undertakings had never been released at the
time of the initial approval. See Bryon, The Canadian Experience of Marks &
Spencer (1978), Foreign Investment Review 4:4.
45. Britton and Gilmour, supra, note 23 at 185.
46. Feltham and Ravenbush, 'Economic Nationalism", in Macdonald, Morris,
and Johnston, eds., Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) 885 at 912.
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criteria or guidelines in considering investment proposals. Such
criteria could be spelled out in legislation or in regulation. "47
II. In Search of Policy
(a) Statutory Criteria
The only guidance in the act regarding policy is found in the five
criteria enumerated in section 2(2) as follows:
The effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and
nature of economic activity in Canada, including without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, the effect on employment, on
resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components and
services produced in Canada, and on exports from Canada; the
degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the
business enterprises . ..and on exports .. . ; the effect of the
acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial effi-
ciency, technological development, product innovation and
product variety in Canada; The effect of the acquisition or
establishment on competition within any industry . . . ;and the
compatability of the acquisition or establishment with national
industrial and economic policies, taking into consideration
industrial and economic policy objectives enunciated by the
government or legislature of any province likely to be
significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment.
Subsection 2(1) implies that the significant benefit test is to be based
exclusively on these criteria, "having regard to all of the factors to
be taken into account under this Act for that purpose." Grover
interprets the words "having regard to" as precluding the executive
from allowing considerations other than those in section 2(2) to
influence its choice, thus making the criteria enumerated therein of
critical importance to the applicant and the decision-maker.4 8 The
first FIRA Minister reported to Committee that these criteria were
"exclusive" and that the review process would "be bound to the
range of five factors and only those five factors." 4 9 In 1982, FIRA
Minister Gray also agreed that "the determination of significant
47. The Gray Report, supra, note 25 at 456.
48. Grover at 37 in "Foreign Investment in Canada", a paper delivered in August
1982, to a symposium in San Francisco on "New Developments in Foreign Trade
and Investment", presented jointly by the International Law Institute of
Georgetown University, the Law Institute of the Pacific Rim, and the Law Institute
of Australia and North America.
49. House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic
Affairs, Proceedings, June 5, 1973, at 26:7.
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benefit to Canada is based solely on the assessment factors that are
set out in some detail in the legislation."
50
(b) Additional Criteria
"Notwithstanding the opening language in ss. 2(2) of the Act and
the comments of the Minister suggesting that the enumerated factors
are exclusive," Donaldson indicates that those experienced with the
review process have learned that at least fourteen other considera-
tions, known as the New Principles of International Business
Conduct, or the Gillespie Guidelines, are often taken into
account. 5' These include the geographic location of the investment;
the structure of the transaction; the financial position of the
Canadian business being acquired; the presence of intervenors; the
elimination of Canadian ownership; under-utilization of the industry
sector; the past experience, if any, of the applicant in dealing with
the agency; the present attitude of the government of the day
towards foreign investment; the presence of unique technology;
world product mandates; the use of joint ventures; vendors'
commitments; and the industry sector under review. The Toronto
Star, usually a defender of FIRA, stated on 29 July 1982 that the
agency's task "is to establish whether each . . .application meets
the test of 'significant benefit' . . . on the basis of 10 criteria . .."
The Act provides for five criteria, the Star found ten, and
Donaldson found an additional fourteen. However, the Member of
Parliament, the investor's solicitor, the editorial writer, and the
foreign government can be excused if they are somewhat confused
about the number of criteria used under the act. When the Gillespie
Guidelines were tabled in the Commons on 18 July 1975, the
minister indicated that they would "provide" an additional
indication of the sort of benefits the government looks for in
assessing investment proposals." On 26 May 1981, Mr. Gray
indicated before Committee that "the criteria applied by the
government in administering the . . .Act are those spelled out in
Section 2(2) . . . [E]ven though I think [the guidelines] require
some further clarification or updating, provide a very good basis for
corporations to assess the way they are conducting themselves as
50. The Hon. Herb Gray, in correspondence between himself as FIRA Minister
and David Weatherhead, M.P. for Scarborough, undated (appears to have occurred
summer of 1982).
51. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 501.
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good corporate citizens." The Gillespie Guidelines have never been
updated, nor has their official position been regularized under ss.
4(2).52 In a brief to the minister, the Canadian Bar Association
(CBA) asserted that "the legislation does not appear to permit the
Review Agency to take into account the [Gillespie Guidelines] in
measuring significant benefit (and indeed this is the Review
Agency's position).' 53 The 1982 budget promised a paring down of
the criteria, saying: "The agency will confine its examination of
undertakings to the key elements of an investment proposal."
If the political executive uses nonstatutory criteria that are
compatible with the act, then it has a responsibility to enunciate
them for applicants, intervenors, and general observers of the
review process. These criteria might be outlined in guideline form
(as is done to advantage by the CRTC), informally through
interpretative notes (as is done under the Income Tax Act), 54 or
simply through reasons for decisions. Such articulation of "rules"
would satisfy the need for greater certainty and transparency in the
review process without limiting flexibility. As Laskin C.J.C. said in
Capital Cities Communication, 55 "it was eminently proper that [the
CRTC] lay down guidelines ...An overall policy is demanded in
the interests of prospective licencees and the public ...Although
[such a policy] could mature as the result of a succession of
applications, there is merit in having it known in advance."
(c) Absence of Publicly Articulated Guidelines under Section 4(2)
For the applicant and the Canadian vendor, profound uncertainty
exists as to the rules of the game, thereby unnecessarily
complicating major business decisions. The process is apt to be
52. "s. 4(2) The Minister may issue and publish, in such manner as he deems
appropriate, guidelines with respect to the application and administration of any
provision of this Act or any regulation made pursuant to this Act".
53. Canadian Bar Association, "Brief to the Minister on the Foreign Investment
Review Agency" (September 1981) at 49 (hereafter the -CBA's brief to the
minister").
54. On 23 August 1982, Minister Gray announced that he had "authorized the
Agency to issue interpretation notes covering certain provisions and expressions of
a legal nature used in the Act which experience has shown to be particularly
difficult to interpret". The notes issued since that time have been in regard to
appealable eligibility issues - "non-eligible persons", and "Canadian business
enterprise*'. There is no indication that notes will be issued in regard to the
important significant benefit test.
55. BI D.L.R. (3d) 605 at 620.
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viewed as capricious by participants, particularly by those that fail
to select lawyers specializing in the process, who, in turn, may be
aware of the expected undertakings and informal criteria employed
at any given moment. Working Paper No. 6 of The Economic
Council of Canada indicates that "for one governmental participant
the negotiating process is akin to a game of water polo in a lake: the
absence of specified boundaries results in a situation wherein at
some point participants get tired and simply decree an outcome."
56
FIRA Minister Gray responded to criticism of his agency's failure to
issue clarifying guidelines by pointing out that the test criteria have,
in fact, been clarified through several means: "First, decisions on
some 4,500 investments have been reported [as either approval or
disapproval] in news releases . . . and, in a substantial number of
cases, the news releases outline in some detail actual undertakings
given by investors . . . Second, FIRA's annual reports . . . Third,
a supplement to the 1978/79 Annual Report described in
considerable detail the types of benefits sought under each of the
assessment factors. Fourth, a number of examples of significant
benefit have been published in the Agency's journal, the Foreign
Investment Review." 
57
While the FIRA Minister failed to articulate guidelines for
various sectors of industry under section 4(2), other ministers were
not so reticent; ministers responsible for cultural industries and
energy did develop Canadian ownership strategies. Such depart-
mental strategies for key industry sectors represent the fifth stage of
foreign investment policy development. In theory, at least, these
policies ought to make the Canadian ownership strategy useful in
the determination of significant benefit under the act. Applicants
might be expected to develop investment proposals, with
undertakings reflecting the Canadian ownership strategy for that
sector. To date, FIRA decisions in these sectors have almost
uniformly mirrored the government's or the department's Canadian
ownership strategy.
(d) Cultural Policy
The Secretary of State, who was recently joined by the Minister of
Communications, has outlined the government's strategy for
56. Shultz, Swedlove, and Swinton, The Cabinet As a Regulatory Body: The Case
of the Foreign Investment Review Act (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,
1980) at 63.
57. Gray, in correspondence to Weatherhead, supra, note 50 at 2-3.
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Canadian ownership of cultural industries, under which a major
segment of the publishing industry would be owned by Canadians.
On 7 November 1977, in an address to the Audit Bureau of
Circulation in New York, Mr. Roberts alluded to a Canadian
ownership policy for the publishing industry: "In publishing it is the
stated objective of the Canadian government to arrive at a situation
in which the majority of the Canadian publishing system is under
Canadian ownership. The Foreign Investment Review Agency has
taken action to insist that when there is an entry into Canada, or
takeover, by companies in the communications area . . that there
be significant benefit for Canadian cultural interests." In the book
publishing sector, the current Minister of Communications has
indicated that his department alone has ultimate responsibility for
determining the specific benefits for Canada in accordance with the
Foreign Investment Review Act. 58 Apart from the energy sector,
perhaps, in "no other industry have Agency decisions- so clearly
crystallized a policy objective of the federal government." 59 Under
the act, Cabinet disallowed Gulf and Western's attempt to indirectly
acquire Simon and Schuster (Canada) Ltd. on 7 May 1976, as well
as Mattel's attempt to indirectly acquire Whitman Golden Limited
on II April 1980, Dow Jones' attempt to indirectly acquire
Irwin-Dorsey on 10 December 1976, and, on 18 January 1979,
Harper and Row's attempt to indirectly acquire Lippincott on 30
July 1981. The Irwin-Dorsey and Lippincott disallowals resulted in
the announced closure of the Canadian operations in the summer of
1982.
The closure of the Canadian operations and the accompanying
furor in Canada marked a turning point. The Canadian media
expressed outrage and, on 30 July 1982, the Globe and Mail ran an
editorial, entitled "Publish and Perish", which pointed out that
Lippincott had operated in Canada since 1897 and that one
Canadian author of Lippincott textbooks had been published in eight
languages. The editorial continued, "few people understand what
makes FIRA tick. The agency rejects applications ...and scares
other[s] . ..off. They take their jobs with them . ..FIRA, by its
own yardstick, is not of significant benefit to the country. In cases
like Lippincott, it is part of the problem. In the end it will have to be
dismantled." On 5 August 1982, in another editorial, entitled "A
58. See note 61.
59. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 504, note 135.
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Distressing Neighbor", the Globe and Mail stated that "the agency
not only delays, and often prevents, foreign companies from
investing ...using yardsticks which appear arbitrary and inconsis-
tent - but can refuse to let one foreign owner sell a firm to another
foreign owner. We saw this in the [Lippincott refusal] - although
there would have been no change in the percentage of foreign
ownership and no new foreign investment in Canada." And on the
same day, the Halifax Chronicle-Herald asked:
How does the [review agency] arrive at its bedevilling definition
of what is of significant benefit? . . .Take the case
of . . .[Lippincott], FIRA's most recent closed book. [It]
operates in Canada for more than eight decades, filling a market
for medical texts and providing an outlet for Canadian scientific
writing. The U.S. parent is purchased by another distinguished
American publishing house, but FIRA will not permit the
Canadian subsidiary to be part of the transaction on the grounds
the new arrangement will not provide significant benefit. . . If
the Lippincott case is an example, FIRA can achieve the letter of
its cultural objectives by pushing more American-controlled
business south of the border .. .leaving a poorer but purer rump
behind in Canada.
Shortly after Lippincott failed on its second application and
announced its intention to close, Cabinet approved the take-over of
Random House (Canada) by the Herald Company of Syracuse,
N.Y. Herald undertook to offer employment to those about to lose
their jobs as a result of the Lippincott closure. Similar approval was
given on 19 November 1982 for the take-over of Whitman Golden
of Cambridge, Ontario, a bid which had been rejected in 1980.
FIRA had become the focus of criticism of foreign investment
policy, although the review agency neither made policy nor
articulated it.60 The focus of public attention may now be about to
shift to the cultural industries minister. In May 1982, Coca-Cola
acquired Columbia Picture Industries and, thus, indirectly acquired
the Canadian subsidiaries. On 16 July 1982, the Department of
Communications requested that the agency make a detailed review
instead of the normal expedited review for small business
60. Working Paper No. 6, supra, note 56 at 54, considers the argument that the
"lightning rod" function may have been the raison d'Etre of the review agency.
-[It could] act as a 'lightning rod' drawing criticism away from the real
decision-makers . . .becoming itself the central reference point in debates on the
policies and process for reviewing foreign investment."
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applications. 61 The request said that a "forced-divestiture of U.S.
control in [Columbia Pictures] to Canadian interests will represent
real benefits to the Canadian film industry: it will enhance the
perception of the government's determination and intentions among
other subsidiaries . . . it is consistent with the Department of
Communications' plans regarding the film industry, it reflects the
outcoming recommendations from the Cultural Policy Review."
Criticism of this matter has been focused on the Minister of
Communications, with New Democratic Party spokesmen charging
that "it is a kind of manipulation of FIRA's role." 62
(e) Energy Policy
The articulated Canadian ownership objectives of the National
Energy Program (NEP), the federal government's energy policy,
had a dramatic effect on the survival rate for applicants in the review
process. The NEP did not indicate what was expected of foreign
firms in the review process, but it clearly indicated a preference for
Canadian ownership, and FIRA became an obvious instrument for
the implementation of these ownership objectives. Three points are
evident from an analysis of those applications that survive the
review process. 63 First, the survival rate for oil and gas companies
is generally lower than average. Second, the rate of acquisitions
allowed is significantly lower than the rate allowed for new
businesses, standing in 1982 at 18 percent and 70 percent,
respectively. Third, the rate of approvals fell significantly in 1981;
whether measured against the previous year's rate or measured
against the approval rate for all applications, it fell to 43 percent for
new business applications and 39 percent for acquisitions, only 67
61. "Fox Throws Spanner into Coca-Cola Application", in Hayden and Burns,
eds., Foreign Investment in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 30
September 1982) at para. 95-5 (hereafter "Hayden and Burns"). It was viewed by
the department as representing "a vital opportunity for [the minister]
to . . . demonstrate the firmness of his articulated intention."
62. Ibid, at para. 95-5. "The Opposition did not criticize Mr. Fox on account of
his cultural policy but for using FIRA as a backdoor means to promote that policy.
An N.D.P. spokesman said that if the goverment had a cultural policy in place
already, there would be a policy, which FIRA could take into consideration in the
case."
63. The category most nearly that of the oil and gas industry is that of mines,
minerals, fuels and incidental services. The approval rate overstates the actual
survival rate due to the tendency for applicants to drop out of the process prior to
being certified as reviewable. Withdrawals, for applicants in all sectors, appear to
be generally equal to or greater than withdrawals after certification.
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and 53 percent of the rate for all applications, and was down from
84 percent and 68 percent, respectively, in the previous year.
Informed observers, critical of the government's Canadian
ownership policy for oil and gas, focused their criticism on the
NEP, not solely on FIRA.
The transfer of responsibility for foreign investment policy-
making did not replace the need for agency guidelines with respect
to the significant benefit test criterion. However, the adoption of
such a departmental Canadian ownership policy should, in fact, aid
in the articulation of the policy in the form of FIRA guidelines.
64
II1. Failure to Survive the Review Process
The need for guidelines to give the review process greater
transparency is better appreciated through a consideration of the
applicants that failed to survive the review process. FIRA
Commissioner Howarth 65 has forcefully argued that "all the FIRA
process does is sort out the 90 percent of foreign investment that's
good for the country from the 10 percent than isn't good." The
Toronto Star, in an editorial of 29 July 1982, again used these
commonly accepted statistics in developing its reason for supporting
the review process: "FIRA does not block foreign investment nor
does it even present a major obstacle; the agency approves nearly 90
percent of the applications it receives." If 90 percent of all
applications were approved, where then is the uncertainty? Are
articulated guidelines likely to make more than a marginal
improvement in consistency and predictability?
(a) Withdrawals
The 90-percent approval rate reflects a partial analysis of the review
process' output. A different perspective emerges when all
applications or inputs are considered in relation to the approvals or
outputs, because an applicant may withdraw a notice at any point in
the review process. 6 6 A withdrawal is likely to occur where an
64. -Guidelines concerning acquisitions of interests in oil and gas rights" were
issued in 1978, but concentrate, as their titles implies, on the acquisition of control.
65. Goar, "The Watchdog Is Hurt by Barks of His Critics", Toronto Star, 12
September 1982.
66. Although the Review Act does not contain any specific section which provides
for the withdrawal of a notice, in practice the review agency will recognize an
applicant's request that its notice under s.8 will be withdrawn. There are likely to
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applicant has determined, often as a result of discussion with the
agency's Assessment Branch, that an acquisition or new business
application will ultimately not be allowed. In 1982, some 793
applications were received 67 and some 456 applications were
carried forward from previous years, for a total of 1,249
applications under consideration by the review agency. Of this total,
some 229 were withdrawn before final determination by Cabinet, 8 1
were formally disallowed, and 513 were allowed. Thus, only 513 of
those 1,249 under consideration in 1982 were allowed, or some 41
percent. A third approval rate that reflects a middle ground is
available. It expresses the number of applications that are approved
as a percentage of the total of "resolved" cases plus those
withdrawn prior to certification - that is, the applicants leaving the
review process. In 1982, the approval rate, using this third method,
was some 62 percent. Each approval or survival rate reflects varying
views of the agency. Perhaps the least acceptable method of
computing the rate is that used by the agency itself when it claims an
approval rate of 90 percent. It provides a false impression of the
work of the agency and the many applications it considers, for many
are considered, but relatively few are allowed.
In a properly functioning system of foreign investment review
where applicants are aware of the rules of the game, the survival
rate should be much higher than either 41 or 62 percent. Applicants
in such a system could estimate their chances of succeeding on the
basis of publicly articulated guidelines. The low survival rate, with
its corresponding high rate of cases that are withdrawn or carried
forward, reflects the confusion inherent in the system, which creates
a test more accurately called an endurance test than a significant
benefit test. An efficient review system would respond quickly, or,
in economic terms, would "clear" with little carry forward from
year to year, and would do so with a transparent enough mechanism
that investors would be aware of the foreign ownership rules at all
times.
(b) Sensitive Industry Sectors
The lowest survival rates appear to be concentrated in sensitive
be as many reasons for withdrawal as there are applicants, but the primary reason in
the major of cases is undoubtedly the failure to achieve a speedy approval.
67. This excludes those applications received by the review agency and returned as
nonreviewable.
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industry sectors. 68 Such applicants face a more stringent section
2(2) significant benefit test in cases involving natural resource and
energy-related industries; certain service industries, particularly
consulting, importation and distribution of manufactured goods,
and insurance and finance; the cultural industries, particularly book
publishing; and the computer-communications-high technology
industries. 69 In the oil and gas industry, which had a take-over
approval rate in 1982 of 18 percent when expressed as a percentage
of resolved cases, it is difficult to identify "the reasons for
allowance or disallowance. ' 70 In the period of 1982 from January
to June, for example, there were three decisions involving oil and
gas exploration, development, and production: on March 4th and
April 26th, the Cabinet rejected applications, while on June 4th it
allowed an application from Pool Petrol Gmbh, a wholly owned
subsidiary of a German firm.
7 1
The significant benefit test, it is generally conceded, was
designed to apply "mainly to manufacturing and resource
industries." ' 72 The minister's response to the CBA's brief
acknowledged that some of the criteria "may have more relevance
to proposals in certain sectors than in others." ' 73 Foreign
manufacturers, for example, that wish merely to establish a business
here to distribute their products are in a near impossible situation,
for such manufacturers are expected to undertake to manufacture
some of their product here, or to enter into a partnership with
Canadians, or both. 74 Kero-Sun Inc. of the United States, which
68. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 507, indicated that -sensitivity is usually a
function of government policy." Hayden and Burns, supra, note 61 at para. 2,
0113-3, state further: "Applications . . . in critical areas are bound to run into
trouble. Applications in the area of culture are critical. The policy . . . at present
seems to be one of extreme vigilance regarding further control over Canadian
cultural industries by foreigners. The other area in which FIRA applications may
run into trouble . . . are: oil and gas, uranium, construction materials, any
acquisition of a business in a Canadian industry which is already extensively
controlled by foreigners; and any application which is significant in its business
sector."
69. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 494, 506-509.
70. Ibid, at 508.
71. Rejecting Internationaler Energie Fonds Gmbh (Calgary) and Jorcan
Exploration Ltd. (Bonnyville, Alberta).
72. The Gray Report, supra, note 25 at 456, and the CBA's brief to the minister,
supra, note 53 at 13.
73. Ibid, at 4.
74. Hayden and Bums, supra, note 61 at para 2,020. Critics of this approach
consider it is of questionable benefit to Canada's industrial structure to have foreign
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sought to establish a distributorship arrangement in Canada, was
twice rejected under the act, and the Attorney General has moved in
the Federal Court of Canada to nullify its distributorship
arrangement. 75 Investment applications to establish new businesses
to import products are refused unless the owner undertakes to
"eventually be engaged in the assembly and/or manufacture of the
products to be initially imported." ' 76 In the consulting and
management service sectors, the number of applications that are
approved equals the number that are disapproved (or resolved).
77
During 1981, new business applications involved in providing
management counselling services relating to the analysis of costs
associated with specific management positions, executive search
services, and management consulting services provided to private
and public consumers of telecommunication services were disal-
lowed, while applications to provide management consulting
services to the securities industry and engineering consulting
services for petroleum projects were allowed.
Investors in sensitive industry sectors are more likely to
withdraw, rather than face their application not being allowed. Only
in the oil and gas industry has the government provided a coherent
view of what its objectives are and what it demands of the industry.
An industrial strategy which concentrated on the sensitive sectors
might prove advantageous to the review process, both for the
applicant and for the decision-maker. Without such direction and
grounding, the review process is akin to a domed stadium with no
walls - a roof floating precariously in each new breeze.
(c) Small Business Procedure
The Gray Report 78 had recommended that the review process
should only consider the "relatively small proportion of foreign
investments which are the greatest concern to Canada at any point in
manufacturers establishing small uneconomic units. Forcing the foreign manufac-
turer to distribute through Canadian distributors tends to be more expensive.
75. Ibid, at 94-4 and 95-8.
76. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 508, further states that, "unless the applicant is
prepared to commit to assemble and/or manufacture in Canada, there is a good
chance that the application, all other things being equal, will be rejected."
77. Ibid, at 508. The FIRA Annual Report, using the roughly comparable category
of community, business, and personal services, indicates that some 62 of the
resolved new business applications were allowed in 198 1 (or about 78 percent of
the average), falling to 44 percent in 1982.
78. The Gray Report at 453 and 491.
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time." Unfortunately, the threshhold specified by ss. 5(1)(c) -
namely, assets under $250,000 and revenues under $3 million - is
too low to be of any such value and is not available for the
acquisition by a noneligible person of an unrelated business. 7 9 The
system of comprehensive review threatens to overwhelm the
agency, and Cabinet spends more time on the review process than
on any other single agency of government.
80
In 1977, a small business procedure was instituted, under s. 6 of
the Foreign Investment Review Regulations, whereby those
investments involving less than $2 million in assets and fewer than
100 employees were eligible to use a short-form notice.
Approximately 78 percent of all investment proposals fall under
these small business threshholds. 8 1 Fast-track procedures have also
been adopted whereby such short-form applications are received by
a special small business unit, which processes and sends the
applications directly to the minister for referral to the Special
Committee of Council (Cabinet) for Order-in-Council approval.
8 2
However, falling under the threshhold has not guaranteed the fast
tract procedures. Prior to 1980, some one third of all small business
applications were bumped. 83 Under the regulations to the act, a
request for further information could cause the business to be
bumped, although the investor was required to comply with the
section 5 notice requirements as provided for under section 6(4).
During the first two years after the Trudeau government came to
office in 1980 with its more stringent significant benefit test
requirements, the number of applications that were bumped is
believed to have increased dramatically.
A variety of explanations has developed to account for the high
number of bumped applications that fall in the small business
category. The CBA's brief to the minister, mentioned above,
79. Working Paper No. 6, supra, note 56 at 28, asserts that the "absence of a
significant threshhold is partly explainable by the opposition of the N.D.P. to
anything less than total review . . . and partly . .. to the statutory drafting then in
vogue at the Department of Justice."
80. Ibid, at 79, indicates that the time taken by Cabinet (especially the Economic
Development Committee) in reviewing individual cases accounts "'for the failure to
produce policy guidance". Goar, in "The Watchdog Is Hurt by Barks of His
Critics", supra, note 65, quotes Commissioner Howarth as stating that "this little
agency accounts for one in every seven Cabinet memoranda."
8 1. Working Paper No. 6, supra, note 56 at 58.
82. Ibid, at 74.
83. Ibid, at 58.
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asserted that, in some cases, the provinces most affected by the
FIRA applications requested that "a long form of notice be filed
because of the Review Agency's inability to condense the
application into a short telex for transmission to the provinces."
8 4
Applications are bumped, it is generally agreed, when a provincial
government or federal department expresses concern. Expressions
of concern or requests for clarification of investment intentions pose
a politically convenient method, particularly for a provincial
government not wishing to be seen as causing the disapproval of a
firm's application, to delay an application and ultimately cause its
withdrawal. Bumpings occur most often when applications fall in
the sensitive industry category. 8 5 Thus Donaldson counsels that: "It
may be prudent" to include in the short-form notice "more detailed
particulars respecting employment, exports, capital expenditures,
research and development, etc. This may have the effect of
eliminating the need for the Agency to require that a long form of
notice be filed."
8 6
Whatever the shortcomings of the small business procedure,
8 7 it
reflects a realization that such applicants are not well served by the
standard review process. New small business threshholds 88 were
announced by the Finance Minister in the 1982 budget, and the
FIRA Minister announced the following threshhold on 30 June
1982: "threshholds for review . . . will be raised from $2 million
and 100 employees to $5 million and 200 employees for new
investment or direct acquisition." With the higher threshholds, the
minister indicated, approximately 95 percent of new business
84. CBA brief to minister, supra, note 53 at 22.
85. CBA brief to minister, supra, note 53 at 22. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 496,
cautions that the longest way around may be the shortest way home. "'It
may . . . be to your advantage if you have a difficult application, one in a sensitive
sector or one where you wish to submit relatively complete data and background in
the form of commitments so as to assist in giving approval. Filing the long form
may ultimately save time..."
86. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 497.
87. Hayden, 'Providing More Certainty for Foreign Investors", in Hayden and
Burns, supra, note 61 at para 2,014 (31 March 1980). Hayden stated that: "The use
of the short form procedure is too restricted . . . The discretion vested in the
Agency to request long form applications has in some cases been abused . . . It is
too easy . . . to require a long form application when they have not been able to
finish assessing a short form application within the 10-day period."
88. The new small-business threshholds and procedures, without a s. 28
foundation, sound remarkably similar to the "'intermediary procedure" used prior
to May 1979. See Working Paper No. 6, supra, note 56 at 76.
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applications and 80 percent of direct acquisitions will be eligible for
consideration under the shortened procedures, compared with 92
and 67 percent, respectively, under the 1977 threshholds.8 9 A
second aspect of the changes to the small business procedure
involves a change of ownership "where . . . a company is acquired
in the course of the acquisition of its parent." About 80 percent of
indirect acquisitions will qualify for the shortened procedures,
compared with about 40 percent under the 1977 threshholds. These
two changes will make about 85 percent of all reviewable
investments eligible for consideration under the small business
procedures.
Small business investors above the old threshhold used the
standard or long form until the s. 6 regulations were amended in
June 1983 to reflect the new higher threshholds, together with a new
expanded short-form notice. It was not until almost twelve months
had elapsed after the new administrative procedures were put in
place that regulations and notice forms regularizing the procedure
were issued. Such a lapse in administrative and legal niceties is
symptomatic of the Review Act's administration. Its procedures
have an "Alice in Wonderland" quality; they mean exactly what
FIRA or its minister deem them to mean at any point in time.
According to the June 1982 announcement, the minister planned
to maintain the right to bump applications "where the investment
appear[ed] to contain important policy issues."- 90 This could have
largely negated the new, higher threshholds, particularly for
applicants in sensitive industry sectors where bumping occurred so
frequently that prudent solicitors normally advised the investor to
use the long form, as it might be less time-consuming. The new
regulations, gazetted on 22 June 1983, indicate a relaxation in this
area, for they contain no provision equivalent to s. 6(4). The new,
coloured short form is deceptively short. It no longer provides room
for the response to the important significant benefit question; in the
future, the question will be answered through the use of
attachments. The applicant is required in his answer to "describe in
some detail the plans for changes in the conduct" of the enterprise's
operations, "to attach any additional information" where it would
be helpful in assessing the merits of the investment, and, "to the
89. FIRA News Release F-46, "Foreign Investment Review Changes" (Ottawa:
30 June 1982) at 2-3.
90. Ibid, at 4.
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fullest extent possible, [to] describe plans in terms of the assessment
criteria." The apparent assumption is that careful applicants in
sensitive sectors will include information in detail equivalent to that
required in the longer form. Proper implementation and administra-
tion of these small business notice procedures and associated
changes may allow the review process to concentrate mainly on the
economically significant decisions.
Commentators have recommended that these new threshholds be
made absolute, so as to leave the agency to concentrate on the
significant decisions. 91 The CBA's brief to the minister recom-
mended an innovative pre-notification procedure, similar to that
used under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of
1976 in the United States, as the preferred course in addressing the
threshhold dilemma. "An appropriate pre-notification procedure
period for the purposes of the Act would be ten days. If the
applicant did not hear from the government within the stipulated
period, an application would be deemed to have been allowed."
9 2
A "pre-notification would permit the elimination of much of the
detail presently required to be included in both short and long
forms . . . while retaining in the Review Agency the ability to
obtain such information where . . . required." This, of course,
differs from the current s. 13 procedures, whereby if, after 60 days,
the minister has not notified the applicant, the Cabinet "shall be
deemed . . . to have allowed the investment." The minister's
response to the CBA stated that the "recommendation will be
considered when the government decides to amend the Act."
IV. Relations Between Canada and the United States
As the dominant foreign investor, the United States is the major
recipient of Canada's foreign investment policy and is often its most
outspoken critic. As a "dirigiste" policy instrument,- designed to
respond to the truncation and lack of technological innovation
evident in foreign-owned enterprises, FIRA accepts from the
91. Atkey's recommendation, in "'What Ottawa Needs To Do With FIRA"
(Financial Post, 24 July 1982), that the government "eliminate any review for
investments under the threshholds announced on June 28th . . frees agency
officials to concentrate on the larger, more significant transaction" and deserves
consideration. Like Atkey, the CBA brief to the minister, supra, note 53 at 23,
argued the desirability of introducing "'meaningful and sharply increased
threshholds before which a notice would not be required."
92. CBA brief to the minister, supra, note 53 at 22-24.
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American investor undertakings to engage in product development,
marketing, manufacturing, and exporting from their Canadian
operations. Medium-sized American corporations, traditionally
more binational than multinational, are often structurally unsuited to
such demands. Prior to 1980, American academic writers viewed
the Review Act as a natural response to Canadian economic and
political needs. "FIRA is Canada's answer to the overcrowding of
the Canadian economy by foreign, primarily American,
investment . . American investors should not assume . . . that
FIRA's barriers are insuperable or its controls necessarily daunting.
An enlightened investor with something special to offer to the
Canadian economy, guided by knowledgeable legal advice, may
still expect to do business within the framework of FIRA; he may
even expect, once over its hurdle, to be afforded FIRA's protection
against unproductive competition or takeover." 93 Thomas Enders,
U.S. Ambassador to Canada, said in a 1979 speech at Stanford
University that he could "understand how Canada, relying as
heavily as it does on outside investment, feels the need for having
such a mechanism to ensure that its interests are identified and
met." ' 94 A former Assistant Secretary of State described FIRA as
"a good thing, it has clarified the rules of the game." ' 9 5 Barrons,
the widely respected American business magazine, observed that
"one has the impression that the only U.S. business which wouldn't
be cordially welcomed to Canada would be Murder Inc." 96 And,
when the Senate Committee was in Washington studying
93. Frank and Gudgeon, Canada's Foreign Investment Control Experiment: The
Law, the Context and the Practice, [1975] 50 N.Y. Univ. L.R. 76 at 78.
O'Sullivan in Canada's Foreign Investment Act Revisited, [1980] 4 Fordham Int'l
L.J., allowed that: "Dwarfed by a powerful neighbor to the south and heavily
dependent upon foreign investment to sustain its economy, Canada has longed for
the capacity to set its own course and lessen its dependency on political and
business decisions in other countries." Also see, Comment, After Two Years:
Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act (1978), 3 N.C.J. Int'l L. Coin Reg. 163;
Comment, The Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act: Red, White and Gray,
(1973), 5 Law and Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1033; Murray and Gerace, Canadian Attitudes
Toward the U.S. Presence (1972), 36 Pub. Opinion Q. 388.; Note, Canada's
Changing Posture Toward Multinational Corporations: An Attempt to Harmonize
Nationalism with Continued Industrial Growth (1974), 7 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. and
Pol. 271.
94. Howarth, from a speech by the FIRA commissioner at a forum on "Canadian
Regulation and Restriction of American Investment" at the Law School of Boston
University on 22 January 1982.
95. Ibid.
96. Editorial,Barrons (July, 1975).
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Canada-United States relations, its members were told "that FIRA
was of no more concern than a California zoning law."
9 7
When the Review Act's post-1980 administration instituted a
more rigorous significant benefit test, the American investor was
hard hit. Certain aspects of the resultant government and business
criticism of the new test reflected uniquely American concerns in
regard to publicly articulated guidelines and rule-making, the
political nature of both the review process and agency, the lack of
exacting administrative procedures, the lack of a broadly based right
of appeal, possible trade-distorting effects of performance require-
ments, and the extraterritorial effects of FIRA decisions.
(a) Nature of the Agency
Much American criticism of the Review Act and its administration
reflects confusion over the nature of the regulator, often based on
experience with American regulatory boards. 98 The review agency
is not administered (as its name might imply) as a quasi-judicial and
seemingly independent regulatory tribunal, comparable to the
CRTC and the National Energy Board or to any number of fully
developed and often highly independent American regulator
agencies. Instead, it is structured and administered more as if it
were a department of government under a responsible minister,
somewhat akin to the Treasury Board secretariat. Secretary of
Commerce Balderidge and U.S. Trade Representative Brock
revealed, in a letter to FIRA Minister Gray, their lack of
understanding of the review agency's independence and structure
when they requested contact with someone in the Canadian
government who would "have some independence from FIRA,
[who] could provide assurances of confidentiality on specific
complaints from U.S. investors." 9 9 FIRA Minister Gray pointed
out, in response, the difficulty of isolating the agency from any such
discussions, saying, "the Agency is not an independent regulatory
body, but is rather an integral part of the Canadian Government and
97. Senate, Canada-United States Relations (Volume III, Canada's Trade
Relations with the United States).
98. See Janisch, The Role of the Independent Regulator)' Agency in Canada
(1978), 27 U.N.B.L.J. 83. At 87, Janisch states that "Canada has never adopted
the American model of an independent regulatory agency, although it
has . . . gone far in that direction", and that "hesitation is of central importance
for an understanding of current regulatory issues in this country."
99. FIRA News Release, F- 174, August 4, 1981.
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is fully accountable to me in regard to all matters relating to the
Administration of the Act."' 10 0 The Brock-Baldridge letter also
made reference to the desirability of "the establishment of clearer
policy guidelines which could be made available to businessmen"
to replace the use of "unstated industrial policies" in the agency's
decision-making. Minister Gray identified an aspect of the problem,
pointing out that FIRA's mandate is that of a regulator and an
"independent" regulatory tribunal is often better suited to
developing the required publicly articulated guidelines, rule-
making, and freedom from political intervention. 10 1 Under the
existing procedures and, indeed, under the Review Act, the political
executive - the Cabinet - acts as the regulator. By tradition,
decision-making in Cabinet is shrouded in secrecy and its decisions
are not appealable to the courts in any meaningful way. Indeed,
Hughes J. of the Ontario Supreme Court recently described the
review agency as "employing today in the ninth decade of the 20th
century the same methods as the Holy Office in the 17th
century.' 1 2 The CBA's brief to the minister added its criticism to
what is essentially a structural problem: "At present, the review
process is the worst of all possible systems: political control without
meaningful effect and decision-making without answerability.'
' 0 3
The Economic Council's Working Paper No. 6 addressed this same
structural issue: "We do not know, and . . . cannot know, if
Cabinet has been consistent, prudent, honest, or indeed lawful in its
implementations of the law. We do not know if Cabinet has been
arbitrary or capricious in its decision-making. We do not know if
Cabinet has been subject to, and a participant in, manipulation by
politically effective groups or individuals. We do not know if the
process is a meaningful attempt to address a perceived public
problem or a 'cosmetic symbol', a fraud to delude the public.
100. Ibid.
101. See Janisch, Policy Making in Regulation: Towards a New Definition of the
Status of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Canada (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 46; Roman, Cabinet Directions to Regulatory Agencies: A Bold Leap
Backward (1981) 2 C.R.R. 5. 137; Schultz, "Regulatory Agencies and the
Dilemma of Delegation", in Dwivedi, ed., The Administration State in Canada
(1982); and Independent Administrative Agencies (Working Paper No. 25), Law
Reform Commission of Canada (1980).
102. Donaldson, supra, note 6 at 517, note 149. The case under discussion is Re
Gowling and Henderson and the Queen, [ 1982] 67 C.C.C. (2d) 327.
103. CBA brief to the minister, supra, note 53 at 49.
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(b) Indirect Acquisitions and Extraterritoriality
The extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust and Trading with
the Enemy legislation helped to trigger the demand for greater
control of foreign investment which culminated in the Foreign
Investment Review Act.' 0 4 Considering Canadian sensitivities on
the matter of extraterritoriality, it is ironic that Americans view the
Canadian Review Act as having an extraterritorial effect and it "is
precisely the kind of interference which the Canadian government
would resent were a foreign government to attempt to legislate in
what would be regarded as a domestic transaction in Canada.'
10 5
Any transaction which transfers a business enterprise to a
"non-eligible person," even though it occurs entirely within a
foreign country and the transferor and transferee are foreign
corporations, is, under the act, reviewable as far as the Canadian
interests are affected. From the outset, the Canadian government
has striven to distinguish between the extraterritorial effect and the
application of the law: "It applies only to the acquisition or
establishment of new businesses within Canada . ..[T]he Act can
have an effect on transactions taking place outside Canada, for
example, when one foreign corporation acquires control of another
foreign corporation and in the process acquires control of the latter's
Canadian subsidiary. But .. .there is a whole world of difference
between extra-territorial application of law and extra-territorial
effects of law or policy. ."106
The United States has expressed concern that, through the
Review Act, "Canada extends its jurisdiction beyond its borders"
when "the agency's jurisdiction has been interpreted as applying
with extra-territorial effect."1 0 7 Ultimately, Canada may need to be
more concerned with American sensibilities as to the perceived
patent unfairness of FIRA actions in regard to such indirect
acquisitions than with the general issue of extraterritoriality.
Although the regulation of indirect acquisitions with extraterritorial
effect can strain relations with both the United States and the
business community, it provides a remarkably powerful tool with
104. O,Sullivan, supra, note 93 at 179.
105. Glover, "FIRA: Practical Insights", in Current Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Canada, 30 at 36 (American Bar Association, 1976).
106. Howarth (FIRA Commissioner), supra, note 94; see also Frank and
Gudgeon, supra, note 93 at 133-136; and Senate Banking Committee Proceedings,
29 Parl., 1st Sess., 4:11 (1973).
107. Brock-Baldridge letter to Minister Gray, supra, note 99.
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which to maintain competition. Considering the level and
importance of foreign ownership in this country, FIRA is capable of
being an effective "Competition Board", in that it can refuse to
allow mergers and acquisitions that reduce or impair competition.
Keeping in mind the perennial American sensitivities concerning
anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, Canada ought to
consider defending such FIRA regulation on the basis of
comparisons with the objectives of American anti-trust legislation.
The facts of Dow Jones v. Attorney General of Canada'0 8 set out
the inherent difficulty of reviewing indirect acquisitions. Between
1965 and 1975, Dow Jones increased its holdings in Richard D.
Irwin Inc. (U.S.) to 22 percent. In 1967, Irwin incorporated a
Canadian subsidiary under the name of Irwin-Dorsey and, in 1975,
Irwin merged with Dow Jones to effect certain tax savings. At that
time, the review agency sought the opinion of the courts as to
whether the merger constituted an acquisition of control, under
ss. 3(6)(h), by a noneligible person. Grant D.J. of the Federal
Court, trial division, found that the U.S. merger constituted an
acquisition of control under the act. Dow Jones had argued that the
merger did not directly involve the shares or assets of a Canadian
business enterprise and that the transfer of Irwin-Dorsey shares was
only incidental (its business operations being unaffected by the
merger). This issue was raised while the act was in Committee and,
at the time, the government's view was "that such a transaction
presented Canada with the same opportunity for furthering
Canadian interests as would a foreign takeover of a 100 percent
Canadian business."' 10 9 As to the issue of extraterritoriality, the
Federal Court held that: "The Act does not regulate the
merger . .. It is only the acquisition of control of a business carried
on in Canada which is subject to review by s. 8 . . .It, therefore,
does not seek to effect extraterritorial activities but is enforced only
in relation to the Canadian business.""1
0
108. (1980), 113 (D.L.R. (3d) 395 (F.C.T.D.). affirmed (1981) 122 D.L.R. (3d)
731 (F.C.A.).
109. Schecter, - FIRA: Experiences of a U.S. Lawyer", Current Legal Aspects of
Doing Business in Canada, 38, supra, note 105 at 42. Also see exchange between
Special Advisor to the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade, and Commerce,
Gualtieri and Stevens in Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs, 29th Parliament, 1st Session, 27: 29-31 (7 June 1973).
110. (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 395 at 400-401. In dicta, Grant D.J., at 401,
indicated that even if an extraterritorial application were involved, the act would
still apply because Parliament has the power to enact legislation having such an
extraterritorial application.
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Such indirect acquisitions constitute about 30 percent of all
acquisition proposals.1 1 1 On average, indirect acquisitions involve
assets valued at nearly two and one-half times the value of the assets
involved in direct take-overs.11 2 It is generally agreed that the
applicants in transactions such as the Dow Jones-Irwin merger,
having as they do little direct connection with Canada, find great
difficulty under the section 2(2) significant benefit test. In fact, the
transaction is often completed before the applicant submits a notice
to the review agency. Americans are particularly annoyed when
FIRA requires specific performance undertakings so as to establish
that an indirect acquisition brings "new" benefits" 3 to Canada,
"although no increase in foreign ownership [has] occurred." 114
Minister Gray's response outlined Canadian concerns over the
effect of foreign investments on the structure of Canadian industry,
but failed to take cognizance of the particular difficulty of
demonstrating that "new" benefits would result from indirect
acquisitions. He stated, "it was intended that the Act would apply
equally to [all] transfers of control . . . if that were not the case, a
very large part of the Canadian economy would be excluded from
the scope of the Act, and the ability of Canadians to gain and
maintain effective control over their economic environment would
be greatly diminished." 115
The minister overstated his difficulty, however. The government
need not exempt indirect acquisitions from the act, but it could show
an understanding of the predicament of those making such
applications, for they are not seeking to invest directly in Canada in
the generally accepted sense. Indeed, under the guise of small
business procedural modifications, the government partially
responded to the problem of indirect acquisitions by creating a
separate small business category for those acquisitions "where a
foreign controlled Canadian company is acquired in the course of
the acquisition of its parent or another foreign controlled
I 11. Minister's response to CBA brief, at II.
112. Infra, note 118.
113. The case comment, Dow Jones and Co. Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada:
The Canadian Foreign Investment Act (1982), 14 Law and Pol'y Int'l Bus. 505,
provides a practical understanding of the s. 2(2) test: -[T]he 'significant benefit'
test is not equivalent to a 'non-detriment' test. In practice, the government
apparently substitutes 'new' for 'significant' which could mean that a foreign
investor's attempt merely to maintain the status quo would be unaceptable."
114. Brock-Baldridge letter to Minister Gray, supra, note 99.
115. Ibid.
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company". This category was created so as to prevent the review
process from unnecessarily complicating investment transactions
which are largely concerned with the acquisition of businesses
outside of Canada. 116 Under the new procedures, indirect
acquisitions of businesses whose gross assets do not exceed $15
million and which have fewer than 600 employees will be treated
the same way as direct acquisitions of small businesses. Firms in
Canada with 599 employees are not, in any real sense, small
businesses. The new category for indirect acquisitions will permit
about 80 percent of such applications to use the new shortened
procedures, or so-called fast-track review process. The develop-
ment of this option reflects a sensitivity to American concerns and
an appreciation of the nature of the transaction. The small business
description may have been politically convenient in light of
American criticism, but may, unfortunately, perpetuate the illusion
that indirect acquisitions are of the same order as direct acquisitions
with respect to foreign control of the Canadian economy.
The CBA's brief to the minister recommended that the significant
benefit test be interpreted as a no-detriment test in situations
involving an indirect transfer of control, "at least in business
sectors not regarded as sensitive."11 7 However, the minister
rejected the no-detriment test, feeling that it "would involve a
major change in the Act because it would impose a new and quite
different standard for the assessment and allowance of a particular
type of reviewable foreign investment.""118  The use of a
no-detriment test for indirect acquisition may involve a major shift
from the rigorous application of the ss. 2(2) test that was used from
1981 to 1982, but that is essentially a political and administrative,
rather than a legal, change (and requires legislative amendment).
Grover argues that the agency already employs the no-detriment test
for small business applications." 9 Others, while not necessarily
agreeing with Grover, argue that "significant benefit has been
misconstrued by the Cabinet and the Agency . . . if foreign
116. FIRA News Release F-46, 30 June 1982, CBA brief to minister.
117. If Irwin-Dorsey had not incorporated a subsidiary, but had only maintained a
branch business in Canada, the Review Act would not have extended to its
Canadian operations. Where there is no Canadian incorporated enterprise, the
reference in ss. 3(6)(h) to "controlled in any manner" does not apply. The Bar
Association, as part of their recommendation on indirect acquisition, recommended
an extension of the act to cover such unincorporated operations.
118. Minister's response to CBA brief, supra, note I11.
119. See note 48.
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investors are willing to operate businesses here efficiently and
profitably, that is significant benefit.''' 2 0 In effect, they are
asserting that the section 2(2) test is capable of a no-detriment
interpretation. Similarly, economists argue for what is essentially a
no-detriment interpretation, asserting that "any potential invest-
ment would be likely to qualify.' 1 2 1 Certainly, in the case of an
indirect acquisition that occurs relatively soon after another one,
equity may demand a no-detriment test, as the subsequent purchaser
may indeed have little room in which to attempt new undertakings
in order to meet a "new" benefits test while still maintaining an
economically attractive operation.
(c) Trade Related Performance Requirements and the GATT
On 5 January 1982, the United States initiated an action alleging
that the review agency obliges nonresident investors to undertake
certain commitments, the effect of which is to distort the flow of
international trade. Such undertakings, it was alleged, were in
conflict with Canada's national treatment obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT). A senior
American trade official explained that "a reduced tariff on an item,
agreed to by Canada in a multilateral trade negotiation, would have
little value to us if an agency of the Canadian Government were to
tell companies that to operate in Canada they would have to agree to
buy such items from Canadian sources. This would impair our right
under the GATT.' 1 22 The undertakings complained of normally
include trade commitments, such as the undertakings by Bally and
Apple Computer, to purchase local products, rather than to import,
or they might include undertakings to export some percentage of
production.
120. Hayden, "Can FIRA Be Suspended", in Hayden and Burns, supra, note 61
at para 2,020 (August 31, 1982).
121. Rugman, Multinationals in Canada: Theory, Performance, and Economic
Impact (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1980) at 136. Professor Rugman, in
a CBC Radio commentary in August 1982, on the FIRA position taken by the
provincial premiers, stated that: "What is a surprise is why any cases are rejected at
all. That they are indicates that FIRA is not simply applying benefit-cost analysis in
an objective and disinterested scientific manner..."
122. Laurence S. Eagleburger, Speech before the Center for Inter-American
Relations in New York City on 1 October 1981. Ambassador Eagleburger was, at
the time, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the State Department.
Reprinted in the United States Department of State Bulletin (December 198 1) at 34.
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Trade-related performance requirements may be in conflict with a
variety of GATT provisions, specifically those governing national
treatment, 123 elimination of quantitative restrictions, 124 and state
trading enterprises. 1 2s More importantly, where a performance
requirement restricts trade in an item covered by a tariff concession,
the practice might be considered to be an impairment of that
concession. Fundamental to the United States' position is the
allegation that performance requirements are being used to restrict
trade in a manner inconsistent with Canada's trade obligations under
the GATT. It was over this point that the United States resorted to
the dispute settlement provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII.
The undertakings amount to a prima facie breach of the spirit of
the GATT. In giving nonresident firms the right to invest in Canada,
the undertakings purport to prevent the firms, through quantitative
restrictions, from importing those products they might otherwise
use in their production process, thereby guaranteeing that a certain
percentage of local goods or services be either purchased or
exported. The GATT panel working on the complaint must decide if
the undertakings breach Canadian tariff concessions either through
the use of discriminatory treatment under Article III, quantitative
restrictions under Article XI, or state trading provisions under
Article XVII. Through its negotiated undertakings or trade-related
performance requirements, the review agency is seeking to
encourage foreign-based firms to end practices that have helped lead
to what was called by the Gray Report the "truncation" of
Canadian industry, and by the Science Council, "technological
123. The national treatment principle is stated in paragraph I of Article III, as
follows: "Laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, ...distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixtures, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so
as to afford protection to domestic products."
124. Article Xt strengthens Article I1, providing that "no prohibitions, or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas ...or other measures shall be maintained by any contracting party
on the importation . . . or on the exportation or sale for export . . . of any
product."
125. The basic state trading provision is found in Article XVII, paragraph I(a):
"Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes . . . a state enterprise or
grants to any enterprise ...privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchase or
sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the
general principles of non-discriminatory treatment ...for governmental measures
affecting imports or exports by private traders."
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underdevelopment". 1 26 "[I]t is . . .well known . . . that foreign
investment can . .. involve costs for the host country, for example,
restraints on export freedom, a low level of research *and
development. The intention of Parliament in enacting the FIRA Act
was to ensure that for the future, the benefits to Canada would
outweigh the costs of new foreign direct investment... 127
V. Into the Second Decade
The Foreign Investment Review Act has provided a framework for a
remarkably flexible policy instrument. The significant benefit test
under section 2(2) and the performance requirements have varied
with the mood of the FIRA minister and his Cabinet colleagues. The
agency does not make industrial policy, but relies on experts in
other areas of the government. In some respects, the agency acts as
a type of clearinghouse, bringing together the various sectoral and
provincial inputs and moving them up to the minister. Where
policies are not enunciated, the agency's job becomes quite
difficult. In 1980, the approval rate for the oil and gas industry's
new business applications stood at 84 percent. Within twelve
months, it had fallen to 53 percent. The decisive factor in this
dramatic drop was a change in govemment and, hence, in oil and
gas ownership policy, rather than a change in the quality of the
investor application or the structure of the agency.
During the 1980 election campaign, the Liberal party committed
itself to a decidedly nationalistic stance in regard to foreign
investment and ownership: "We want to expand and strengthen
FIRA not weaken it. FIRA's mandate will be broadened to include
periodic review of all foreign firms ... to assess the performance
of these companies . . .FIRA will be required to publicize
proposed foreign take-overs . ..FIRA will help provide financial
assistance to Canadian companies that want to compete for foreign
takeovers or repatriate foreign owned assets.' 128 The post-election
Speech from the Throne reiterated the Liberal election platform:
"The Foreign Investment Review Act will be amended to provide
for performance reviews . . .As well, amendments will be
introduced to ensure that major acquisition proposals by foreign
126. See note 21.
127. Minister's response to CBA brief, supra, note Il1 at 3.
128. Pierre Trudeau, in a February 12th pre-election speech to the Toronto
Advertising and Sales Club in Toronto.
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companies will be publicized..." However, no such amendments
were enacted; instead, the government was able to use the existing
act's section 2(2) significant benefit test to reduce reviewable
foreign direct investment in the oil and gas industry to a trickle. The
NEP, although it was developed outside of the review agency,
promised a key role for FIRA when it stated that "the Foreign
Investment Review Agency will vigorously enforce its investment
criteria in the energy sector."
The United States government expressed extraordinary criticism
of the frequent use of sophisticated performance requirements in the
form of undertakings to export, manufacture, purchase locally or
develop and market products; the extraterritorial effect of the review
of indirect acquisitions; the more stringent significant benefit test;
and certain of the more onerous aspects of the NEP. The action
under the GATT against the so-called trade-related performance
requirements was but one example of the priority that the Reagan
administration gave to rolling back these nationalistic policy
initiatives. "Canadians should know," Canadian Ambassador
Gotlieb warned, "that there is a growing mood in this country that
the U.S. is not getting a fair shake." ' 129 The United States
government cannot take all the credit for stopping the amendments,
although the American criticism was articulate and effective - and
FIRA administrative procedures were indeed poorly developed,
without effective guidelines, and the review process often reflected
short-term political needs more than the legal or economic
requirements of the act. Some of the proposed amendments may
have been unwise, particularly in light of the world-wide recession.
The experience of the NEP indicated that an aggressive
Canadianization program targeted at a single industry might frighten
off Canadian, as well as foreign, investors.
The November 1982 budget gave formal recognition to the
shelving of the previous year's election commitments to strengthen
FIRA, stating that "no legislative action is intended on these
measures until programs on the major initiatives already
undertaken . . . [have] been assessed." By March 1982,130 the
reversal was almost complete - the promised performance reviews
of foreign-owned firms had become a commitment to consult with
129. Financial Times, 15 November 1982, and considered in Doran, The United
States and Canada: intervulnerabilio and interdependence I1 (1983), 38
International Affairs 128 at 141-142.
130. Minister's response to CBA brief, supra, note 11I.
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all large firms so as to "exchange specific information about
government and corporate plans which will be helpful . . . in
promoting the best interests of Canada's economic development."
The FIRA minister indicated that "it would not be appropriate for
this [new] process to be administered by the Agency" and that "an
amendment to the Act [would] not be required."
Even though the government reneged on its commitment to
strengthen FIRA legislatively, certain administrative reforms were
made, namely, an expansion of the small business procedures and
the issuance of Interpretation Notes as to the reviewability of an
investment. In August 1980, FIRA Minister Gray indicated a desire
for administrative reforms "aimed at providing the public with
greater insight into factors behind the allowance of proposals" and
to "make it possible for the public to understand better what is
meant by benefits to Canada." 131 The minister also indicated a
desire to "improve the effectiveness" and efficiency of the agency
and the "way it is administered". Although the agency's annual
report for 1983 has yet to be tabled in Parliament (thereby providing
accurate statistical data), there are early indications that the
approval rate has improved, the number of cases that are withdrawn
has declined, and the processing time has been markedly reduced.
Such initiatives were more in keeping with actions taken by the
previous Clark government than with Liberal election promises.
The Progressive Conservative FIRA minister had issued a special
supplement with the act's 1979 Annual Report, outlining in
summary form what the significant benefit test had come to mean.
The Clark government conducted an interdepartmental task force
review of FIRA operations and established a special House of
Commons Committee to inquire into the extent to which the act was
achieving its purpose, to recommend changes to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the act, and to examine the scope and
method of the review process under the act. The final act of
retrenchment by the Trudeau government was the replacement of
FIRA Minister Gray by Trade Minister Lumley, and Commissioner
Howarth by a senior Treasury Board official. The new commis-
sioner is expected to use his Treasury Board expertise to develop
more structured administrative procedures. 132 The June 1982
13 1. Quoted in CBA brief to minister, supra, note 53.
132. See Valpy, -Sore Thumb No More", Globe andMail, 31 August 1982: "[l]t
is hoped that he will be inventive with the agency and know how to make it blend in
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budget stated that efforts would "be made to avoid red tape and
extended delays." Minister Lumley has announced the formation of
a private sector advisory group to provide a sounding board on any
and all matters concerning the act and its administration.1
3 3
However, Lumley, a businessman, displays none of Gray's passion
for dealing with foreign investment issues.
Pundits and pollsters speculate that the current Liberal govern-
ment will be replaced at the next general election by the Progressive
Conservatives. In Parliament, the Progressive Conservatives have
often been critical of the Liberal government's foreign investment
legislation and policy. The current emphasis of the P.C. Party is on
efficient and responsible government and the avoidance of radical
commitments. A recent Party Working Paper on foreign investment
policy expresses some support for the concept of review, stating that
"within bounds, and considering the track record of many
multinationals . . . this quid pro quo appears legitimate if the
approval process were swift and efficient, if there was not the 'lack
of transparency' in FIRA's goals and methods, and if there was no
political interference. .. 134 The paper goes on to "advocate
keeping FIRA in place." Investor applications, it states, "should be
processed quickly and efficiently, and the secrecy
surrounding . . . goals and methods should be eliminated."
Somewhat hopefully, it concludes that, "with these improvements
in place . . . criticism of the operation of FIRA would rapidly fade
away. "
The interpretation notes' 35 may prove to be the forerunner of
proper guidelines to assist the investor in regard to the section 2(2)
significant benefit test. In addition, the increased small business
threshholds will help the review process be more selective.' 3 6 By
smoothly with whatever economic policy the Government wants to follow. The
Government would like to end FIRA's days as a sore thumb."
133. Such an advisory group is yet to be created.
134. The Hon. Sinclair Stevens, P.C. Caucus Critic for Industry and Trade
(responsible for the party's foreign investment policy), February 1983.
135. Supra, note 54.
136. Minister Gray's announcement of "further foreign investment review
changes" on 23 August 1982 included the following statement by the minister:
"These initiatives show that we want to make Canada's policy on foreign
investment and its administration as clear and as efficient as possible without
straying from the objectives set by Parliament or the commitments made by the
Government. "
234 The Dalhousie Law Journal
steadying its course, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (and
the act) have helped still criticism in Parliament and in the United
States. However, it is unlikely that FIRA will ever be everybody's
friend; indeed, if that should happen, there might be cause for
worry. Managing the agency will always demand diplomacy,
judgment, and a thick skin. Nevertheless, foreign investment
review is here to stay and the act will continue to be a principal
instrument in the implementation of foreign investment policy.
